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Feminist theory provides a rich source of insight into the power and
limits of the law in molding social relations. The feminist critique touches
every institution of human life, casting new light on the ways in which we
experience ourselves and the world.' Zillah R. Eisenstein provides an elo-
quent contribution to feminist theory.2 She contrasts feminism with the
range of other contemporary American political thought-liberalism, con-
servatism, neoconservatism, the Old and New Right. She offers a trench-
ant critique of the contemporary revision of and reaction to the feminist
challenge to a sexist society, analyzes recent developments in electoral
politics as largely a response to the potentially radical implications of
mainstream feminist claims, and articulates an affirmative vision of social
relations that will interest anyone who cares about a better world, not just
for women, but for people and families in general. The first half of this
review examines Eisenstein's central points: her vision of feminism, her
critique of contemporary revisions of feminism, and the complex relation-
ships between feminism and other dominant political and economic ideolo-
gies. The second half of the review attempts to make the abstractions of
these competing world views more concrete by applying them to one spe-
cific social problem-the care of the old.
* Professor of Politics, Ithaca College.
t Professor of Law, New York University School of Law and MacArthur Prize Fellow. Martha
Minow, Elizabeth Schneider and Barry Ensminger generously shared encouragement, ideas and their
scarce time.
1. See generally WOMEN'S R'rs. L. REP. and HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. Somewhat more concretely,
see C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINA-
TION (1979); Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women:
Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REV. 55 (1979); Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
2. Z. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY (1984) [hereinafter cited by page number
only].
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I. A STATEMENT OF FEMINISM
Although Eisenstein's book is dense and expansive, she keeps clear fo-
cus on several core insights which together constitute the feminist chal-
lenge to patriarchy. Such clarity is difficult to achieve, because the central
ideas of feminism are each complex and, at a superficial level, sometimes
appear to conflict. Briefly, these are the six complex concepts that Eisen-
stein keeps in the air and juggles in intricate patterns:
Individual women's steady demands for equality and liberty ap-
peal to ideals of justice shared across the political spectrum and have
serious potential for radical social change.'
Gender is socially constructed, i.e., the culture, the law, and the
material relationships within and between the family and market-
plAce all give deep meaning to gender."
A core aspect of the social construction of gender is that culture
and law5 assign women responsibility for the socially and economi-
cally necessary work of nurturing, childrearing, managing household
consumption, and providing domestic labor.'
Although the meaning of gender is socially defined, "identity is
both a biological, material reality and simultaneously a part of a sex-
gendered system;" the female body-distinguished by its capacity for
childbearing-must be central to any feminist political theory.7
The state and the law institutionalize male power by mystifying
the division between public and private life as one of "natural" sex-
ual difference, enforcing the separation of public and private life and
with it the distinctness of male and female existence.8
Although the patriarchal character of the state and the law re-
quires feminists who seek to use state power as a vehicle for social
change to exercise caution, struggles within the law are nonetheless
3. P. 12.
4. Eisenstein argues that women are a sexual class, "because what they do as women-the activi-
ties they are responsible for in society, the labor that they perform-is essential and necessary to the
operation of society as it presently exists." P. 146 (emphasis in original). In this sense, women are a
class within a traditional Marxist framework because of their relationship to the means of production.
In addition, women are a sexual class because "the biological female is transformed through a series
of political relations into a woman, differentiated from man." P. 150. Finally, women are a sexual
class because they are able to develop and act upon a sexual class consciousness. Id. "They become a
class in actual struggle against patriarchal privilege." P. 154.
5. P. 108.
6. P. 146.
7. P. 216. "What does sexual equality mean and how does one try to create truly egalitarian
relations while recognizing the biological differences constituted by women's ability to bear children?"
P. 206.
8. P. 92. See also D. Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PRO;RESSIVE CRITIQUE 294 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); J. Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and
Patriarchy, in MARXISM AND THE LAW 297 (P. Beirne & R. Quinney eds. 1982).
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important for feminists seeking to achieve both material and ideolog-
ical change. 9
The claim that the law should treat women and men as individuals, not
as members of a sexually determined class, necessarily denies that gender
differences are natural or immutable.10 Our concepts of gender, and par-
ticularly our ideas about motherhood and sexuality, cast man as strong,
woman subservient; man as irresponsible for family care, woman as nur-
turant; man as sexually aggressive, and woman as victim, whether virgin
or whore. In Simone de Beauvoir's classic words, "One is not born, but
rather becomes, a woman."11 Yet although feminism begins with the basic
claim that these gender differences are not natural, and liberty and equal-
ity should extend to women, feminism has, Eisenstein argues, implications
far more radical than simply extending liberal rights to women. The so-
cial construction of gender shapes not only our ideas about who we are,
but the social and economic arrangements that determine the texture of
our daily lives. Under the normal prevailing arrangements of market and
family, the price a woman pays for the warmth, support and legitimacy of
family is to subordinate her capacity to achieve and contribute in the pub-
lic world to the nurturing needs of children, parents and men."2 Further,
because the structure of the law and the state differentiates between the
public and private, the market and home, claims to liberty and equality
have value only in this traditional male world of market and public life.
The morality of motherhood is one of giving, connection and self-sacrifice,
while the morality of the male world is one of achievement, autonomy and
self-interest.13 The prevailing social construction of gender means that
normal economic relations systematically deny the worth of traditional
women's work in the home and wage market.
14
Thus individual women's claims for formal equality in the traditional
male world are radical because the working mother embodies the contra-
diction between the liberal promise of equality in public and market life
and the reality that our liberal society depends upon the unpaid work
performed by women in the home. But individual claims for formal equal-
ity alone are insufficient to achieve either liberty or equality. Within the
context of socially constructed gender, rights of formal equality can only
9. Pp. 99-100.
10. Remember Rosa Parks? If not, see M.L. KING, STmIDE TOWARD FREEDOM (1958). Betty
Friedan, whose recent work Eisenstein describes and critiques, is another excellent case study of a
woman who transcended her social condition. Pp. 189-200.
11. S. D- BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (1957).
12. P. 37.
13. P. 34.
14. For my discussion of these issues, see Law, Woman, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of
Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1282-1335 (1983).
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help the exceptional individual who, in some limited respect, transcends
the pervasive constraints of social construction. Individual claims do not
dismantle the social meaning of gender. Indeed, insofar as such claims aid
women seeking access to traditional male roles on male terms, traditional
female virtues are implicitly devalued further.15 Recognizing formal rights
to individual equality, without dismantling the institutional relations sup-
porting the social construction of gender, can in fact exacerbate the vul-
nerability of women.1
Eisenstein argues that liberalism, capitalism, and patriarchy are tightly
interdependent. All assume a sharp division between altruism and compe-
tition, home and market, private and public, economy and state, passion
and reason, women and men. If, as feminists claim, the distinctions be-
tween women and men are suspect, then perhaps so are the other distinc-
tions.1  To challenge gender inequality is to challenge the institutions it
supports. As women enter the wage market and encounter sexual bias,
including the expectation that they will continue to bear the responsibili-
ties for home and children, they discover that our social arrangements
cannot fulfill promises of individual equality without profound structural
change.
Despite the limitations of formal liberal rights, struggles within the law
are an important part of the process of challenging patriarchal privilege.
They heighten the contradiction between the law's promise of neutrality
and equality and the reality that liberalism and capitalism depend on pa-
triarchy. Further, apart from its ideological function, the law also "struc-
tures choices, options, and so on, and in this sense has a real, material
presence that at one and the same time mystifies other concrete relations
of power."" 8 For example, the law determines whether abortion is prose-
cuted as a crime or protected as a constitutional right. Women's claim to
15. See Note, Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 487 (1981).
16. For example, courts often limit alimony or support to women who have worked in the home
for many years, assuming that when marriage ends, the woman can support herself. A Florida court,
denying alimony to a homemaker of 21 years, said "In this day and time, women are as well educated
and trained in the arts, sciences, and professions as are their male counterparts." Beard v. Beard, 262
So. 2d 269, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
More generally, see L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECoNOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). Using Bureau of La-
bor Statistics data, Weitzman shows that following divorce the standard of living of men improves by
42%, while that of women declines by 73%, and argues that the movement to no-fault divorce has
disadvantaged women. Some, such as Schrag, Book Review, THE NATION, Dec. 7, 1985, at 620,
characterize these facts as "one of the great embarrassments of the modern feminist movement." This
of course ignores that most divorced women have always been disadvantaged economically and that
feminists were only one small ambivalent voice supporting the movement away from fault-based di-
vorce. See BABCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WOMEN AND THE LAW 261-88 (1974); see also
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reproductive liberty is critical materially and ideologically; to claim repro-
ductive freedom is to reject social norms that label women as victims, vir-
gins or self-sacrificing mothers. 19 Similarly, the state controls the terms on
which social forms of child care or nurturing services are available, and
thus profoundly shapes women's lives.
Combining the threads of these six analytic skeins, Eisenstein weaves
two rich tapestries. In the first she criticizes other feminists who would
cabin the radical implications of the forces they have helped to unleash by
dropping one or another of the essential elements of the feminist challenge
to patriarchy. In the second she analyzes the recent ascendence of New
Right and neoconservative power in Washington, arguing that these de-
velopments confirm the power of the feminist challenge to patriarchy.
II. FEMINIST REVISIONISM
Sexual equality challenges the social meaning of gender and requires
radical change in our legal and economic order. Radical change is both
scary and difficult to achieve. Today, many feminists feel discouraged and
overwhelmed by attempts to seize opportunities traditionally reserved for
men while continuing to bear the responsibilities traditionally assigned to
women. Some respond by blaming feminism for extending false promises.
Others suggest revisions of core feminist claims.
Eisenstein identifies two major strains of feminist revisionism. The first
claims, in various ways, that perceived sex-based differences are natural
and inherent, rather than socially constructed. The second denies the radi-
cal nature of feminism by characterizing the challenge of sexual equality
as a simple matter of individual claims to fair treatment and choice.
Eisenstein helps us to evaluate these revisions, urging us to reject their
flaws and to reaffirm our demand for meaningful equality.
Some feminists, observing that formal equality has failed to empower
women and has implicitly devalued traditional women's work and lives,
assert that women and men are naturally, essentially different, and that
the feminist task should be to enhance traditional women's roles.20 Al-
19. P. 34.
20. For example, in 1964 Alice Rossi was committed to a socially androgynous conception of the
roles of men and women, but today she argues that "biological conventions shape what is learned, and
that there are differences in the ease with which the sexes can learn certain things." Compare Rossi,
Equality Between the Sexes: An Immodest Proposal, 93 DAEDALUS 607, 608 (1964) with Rossi, A
Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, 106 DAEDALUS 1, 4 (1977) (footnote omitted). Others, such as
Susan Griffin and Mary Daly, describe a biological, almost mystical, female essence, which they claim
is superior. S. GRIFFIN, WOMAN AND NATURE: THE ROARING INSIDE HER (1978); M. DALY,
GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHIcS OF RADICAL FEMINISM (1979) (discussed in Z. EISENSTEIN at
221-25). Jean Elshtain also affirms essential, biological, sex-based differences. Elshtain, Against An-
drogeny, TEI.OS, Spring 1978 (discussed in Z. EISENSTEIN at 215-16). See also J. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC
MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMAN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (1981).
1773
The Yale Law Journal
though the reasons for this development are understandable, Eisenstein
urges us to hold fast to the insight that gender differences are socially
constructed. A feminist affirmation that women and men are naturally
and essentially different seriously undercuts the individual claim to formal
equality. But more important, blurring the differences between biology
and culture disguises the economic and political constructs that give mean-
ing to gender.
The impulse to affirm that some gender differences are natural is par-
ticularly strong in relation to motherhood and sexuality. Again, this is
understandable. There is, of course, a material reality to the biological
difference between the sexes in relation to reproduction. Yet the social
construction of sexuality and motherhood are core mechanisms by which
patriarchal culture attaches social meaning to gender. Adrienne Rich ob-
serves that "[t]he body has been made so problematic for women that it
has often seemed easier to shrug it off and travel as a disembodied
spirit. ' 21 Eisenstein simultaneously affirms that the biological capacity for
reproduction distinguishes men from women, while seeking to dismantle
oppressive constructions of the meaning of this difference. 22 She challenges
us to develop a politics that neither denies biology nor uses it to justify
prevailing social relations.
Eisenstein argues that motherhood is political, as well as biological. She
criticizes those-across the political spectrum-who claim that "mother-
ing" comes naturally to women, as well as those, such as Betty Friedan,
who treat motherhood solely as a matter of individual choice and underes-
timate the social arrangements that constrain choice.
23
Similarly, some feminists respond to the political and personal dangers
of sexuality by rejecting the notion that feminism is concerned, in a cen-
tral way, with sexuality. 24 Eisenstein critiques others who regard sexual-
ity as critical to gender hierarchy, but who describe gender-based differ-
21. A. RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD As EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 40 (1976).
22. For my discussion of these issues, see Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REv. 955 (1984).
23. "In The Feminine Mystique Friedan argued for women's right freely to reject housewifery
(and motherhood) and to enter the market. In The Second Stage she argues that women should have
the right to be in the market and to choose motherhood as well. The theme-the individual's freedom
of choice-remains the same." P. 199. Friedan says, "I am for life and for family . . . .I am not for
abortion-I am for the choice to have children." B. FRIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE 107 (1981) (em-
phasis omitted). Eisenstein asks, "[gliven the government's lack of commitment to child care, the rise
of teenage pregnancies, the increasing number of woman-headed single-parent families, and the dis-
mantling of social welfare programs, what does Friedan think freedom of choice means?" P. 202.
24. For example, Jean Elshtain "criticizes feminism for its supposed commitment to androgyny,
its flight from feeling, its endless selfishness." P. 213 (footnote omitted).
In recent years Betty Friedan has argued against connecting feminist politics with gay liberation,
saying, "it twists the focus to sexual politics ...[I]t gets mixed up with the reaction against the
female role, and threatens people who feel sex should be private and are mixed up about it them-
selves." B. FRIEDAN, supra note 23, at 319.
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ences in relation to sexuality as essential, biological differences between
women and men. Andrea Dworkin, for example, says that "[t]he immuta-
ble self of the male boils down to an utterly unselfconscious parasitism,"'2 5
and that "[tierror issues forth from the male, illuminates his essential na-
ture and his basic purpose. "26 Women, by contrast, "are booty, along with
gold and jewels and territory and raw materials. ' 27 Somewhat more sub-
tly, Catharine MacKinnon claims that "male morality sees that which
maintains its power as good, that which undermines or qualifies it or
questions its absoluteness as evil,' 28 and argues that "[w]omen and men
are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we know them, by the social
requirements of heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual domi-
nance and female sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is the linch-
pin of gender inequality.
'29
Eisenstein retorts: "[I]t is not helpful to set up a causal relation be-
tween sexuality and gender."30 Both are constructed out of series of social
relations that define the other's meanings. To assume that "there is such a
thing as sex, or sexuality (in some natural-presocial-form)" avoids the
true issue of how both sexuality and gender are constructed. 1
Authentic communication about sex is enormously difficult. Our under-
standing of sexuality-the social and individual influences on choice of sex
object, sources of lust, and connections between passion and relation-
ship-is breathtakingly primitive. The feminist and gay effort to explore,
intellectually and experientially, the gendered social meaning attached to
sexuality provides a weapon for those who would defend a status quo that
is puritanical, as well as patriarchal.3
2
The second major form of feminist revisionism is the tendency to under-
cut the radical potential of feminism's challenge to patriarchy by asserting
that women are capable of achieving liberty or equality one by one. This
view characterizes women's claims for equality as matters of individual
choice, without acknowledging, indeed, even denying, that "patriarchy,
capitalism, and racism impose constraints on individual freedom." 3 For
25. A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 13 (1981).
26. Id. at 16.
27. Id.
28. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 501, 511 (1984).
29. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS
515, 533 (1982) (footnote omitted).
30. P. 152.
31. Id. (emphasis in original).
32. See A. Echols, The Taming of the Id: Feminist Sexual Politics, 1968-83, in PLEASURE AND
DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 50, 63-65 (C. Vance ed. 1984).
33. P. 195.
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example, Betty Friedan has said, "'[o]ur own self-denigration of ourselves
as women and perhaps our own fears are the main problem."'
34
Feminists who embrace this individualistic approach share Jean
Elshtain's belief that "equality of opportunity and equality of treatment
are ultimately incompatible."3 5 But those feminists who would limit
women's demands to equality of opportunity do not recognize that so
much must be remade to make opportunities really equal, including the
very standards by which results are judged. Feminists, and the civil rights
movement generally, challenge supposed meritocratic standards that are
defined in white, male terms. We can applaud the notion that excellence,
hard work and diligence deserve reward and recognition, yet condemn
standards of distinction that systematically exclude women and people of
color. We need a concept of equality that values nurturing and relation-
ship, not as inherent differences between women and men, but as human
strengths that have been devalued by being removed from the market and
assigned to people removed from the market. To challenge allegedly neu-
tral standards of quality for neglecting virtues of care and connection is
not to deny the value of merit-based reward, but to use a richer concept of
worth.
In sum, Eisenstein provides a powerful account of feminism, incorpo-
rating a traditional liberal respect for individual rights with an under-
standing that patriarchy denies equality, not simply on an individual ba-
sis, but systematically through the social construction of gender.
III. NEOPATRIARCHY
Eisenstein's analysis of New Right and neoconservative ideology helps
us to understand that the fury of conservative reaction to feminism does
not show we are on the wrong track or have "gone too far," but confirms
the radical implications of women's basic claims for liberty and equality.
There is broad support for these claims. If change at times seems slow in
coming, it is not because of the strategic or intellectual failings of femi-
nists, but because a powerful minority has mobilized energetically to pre-
serve its privilege.
The New Right and neoconservatives have shared political power in
Washington for several years. Their agenda is obviously complex. Eisen-
stein takes issue with progressive analysts who explain the Reagan Ad-
ministration's assault on working people and the poor solely in class
terms,36 arguing that the Administration also seeks to restabilize patri-
34. Id. (quoting B. FRIEDAN, IT CHANGED MY LIFE 103 (1977)) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted); see also supra note 23.
35. Elshtain, The Feminist Movement and the Question of Equality, 7 POLITY 452, 473 (1975).
36. See, e.g., F. PIVAN & R. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR: REAGAN'S ArrACK ON THE
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archy by making it more difficult for women and children to survive with-
out a man.
The New Right shares with feminism the understanding that the patri-
archal family and prevailing economic structures are tightly related. Both
understand that the paid labor market is structured on the assumption
that workers, i.e. men, are supported by family, i.e. women, who meet
their daily emotional and material needs, as well as care for the vulnera-
ble young and old. Both perceive that the exponential increase in the
number of married women and mothers in the wage market poses a
profound threat to these basic arrangements.
Even people who consider it "natural" that women do the unpaid work
in the home hold that in the marketplace "[p]eople are supposedly indi-
viduals, not members of a sexual class. Hard work is supposed to be re-
warded. When the married woman enters the market, she embodies a con-
tradiction. As a worker she is supposedly an individual, and as a married
woman she is a member of a sexual class."13 7 As these women begin to
recognize the sexual bias of the marketplace and continue to bear the re-
sponsibilities of housework and child care as well, they discover that soci-
ety cannot deliver on its promise of equality or even equal rights for
women.
38
The New Right's response to this is contradictory. They affirm that
equality of opportunity exists for anyone willing to work hard, yet at the
same time they insist that men and women are naturally different. Some
members of the New Right would reject norms of sex-based equality even
in the marketplace. George Gilder, for example, argues that even though
sex-based differences are natural and fundamental, social policy must re-
inforce them to preserve the traditional family. Men must be given prefer-
ence in wage labor and public life to reinforce male dominance in the
family and familial dependence upon them. The patriarchal family, more-
over, is essential to curb men's natural tendencies toward aggression. 39
The New Right also rejects liberty of sexuality and sexual preference "as
breeding sexual license and hedonism and a breakdown of the (heterosex-
ual, monogamous) family life."'40 The New Right's economic program
seeks, in part, to reconstruct the patriarchal family by alleviating the twin
burdens of taxes and inflation, thereby freeing married women from the
need to earn a "second" income.
41
WE.FARE STArTr' AND ITS CONSEQUENCFS (1982) (discussed in Z. EISENSTEIN at 125).
37. P. 51.
38. P. 41.
39. P. 55. Gilder says, "the movement is striking at the Achilles' heel of civilized society: the role
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The New Right also shares with feminism a rejection of the liberal
dichotomy between public and private spheres, with sexuality and family
defined as "private" matters properly distinct from the "public" concerns
of political life. In its place the New Right promotes a culturally and
legally enforced ideal of the patriarchal family. But the feminist challenge
to the public/private dichotomy is more complex. Feminists criticize the
state's role in patriarchy, yet at the same time insist that collective re-
sponses are needed to protect vulnerable people and to organize the work
that the patriarchal culture has traditionally assigned to women. Like
feminism, the New Right is radically subversive to the modern liberal
state because it "demystifies the place of sex and family life within the
political order by challenging the private/public split on these issues."42
Neoconservatives share the New Right's distress at the feminist chal-
lenge to existing arrangements but are less willing to use direct state
power to preserve the patriarchal family. Instead, neoconservatives seek to
save liberalism from the "excesses" of equality and liberty.
43 "[T]he crisis
of liberalism is not merely a political crisis, it is also a cultural problem.
The individual, which is the root concern of liberalism, has begun to be
hedonistically centered on himself, or more likely herself. . . [, represent-
ing] the troublesome extension of liberal individualism."" To save us
from these excesses, neoconservatives would reject the changes in social
arrangements that make liberty and equality possible. For example, ne-
oconservatives would dismantle the social programs of the New Society,
which, they argue, create unreasonable expectations and weaken the "me-
diating structures"-family, church and community-that stand between
individual and state.4 5 Neoconservatives ignore the fact that these mediat-
ing structures run on the voluntary labor of women. They condemn af-
firmative action, which they characterize as demanding equal results for
people of unequal merit. Neoconservatives believe that a race in and of
itself requires winners and losers, and "the problem is that everyone today
claims the right to win.""" However, they do not recognize that the mar-
ket and political system are structured to favor elite, white men, who have
a team, i.e., the family and old boy network, in the pit to pass water and
cheer them on.
42. P. 82.
43. P. 62. Among the major neoconservative works that Eisenstein critiques are: AMERICAN EN-
TERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, MEETING HUMAN NEEDS (J. Meyer ed.
1982); D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1975); I. KRISTOL, Two
CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM (1978); P. STEINFELS, THE NEOCONSERVATIVES: THE MEN WHO ARE





Vol. 95: 1769, 1986
Equality
In addition, many neoconservatives now affirm that gender differences
are natural.47 Midge Decter, for example, argues that women need heter-
osexual marriage, not solely for economic reasons, but to put "a lid on
their freedom."48 She explains, "[flor the middle-class woman her oppor-
tunities to participate in the world beyond household-to educate herself,
limit her family, go to work, and to an unprecedented extent make her
life-have left her in a sometimes nearly overwhelming state of
uncertainty."49
The Reagan strategy, while causing enormous pain to millions of peo-
ple, cannot reconstruct the patriarchal family. Too much has changed,
both in the economy and in the aspirations of women and men. The neo-
conservative effort to preserve the patriarchal family confuses cause and
effect. Neoconservatives assert that the welfare state has destroyed tradi-
tional family and wage labor relationships, when in fact profound changes
in family and work have created both the need and the desire for dual
wage-earning families and welfare state programs.
Jobs that allow a single wage-earner to support a patriarchal family
are no longer available for most people due to structural changes in the
labor force, principally the massive shift of jobs from unionized industrial
work to nonunionized, low paid service and retail-trade work.50
"[M]ultinationals have shifted amortization funds overseas to the strategic
handful of export platforms whose political regimes maintain a combina-
tion of literate skilled labour with low wages . . . .- Our society has
become increasingly dichotomized between the wealthy and the poor. The
middle class is vanishing. These changes in the economy prevent a return
to the patriarchal home with daddy in the marketplace and mommy bak-
ing cookies for the kids and gramps, even were this return thought
desirable.
Most people, however, do not see the patriarchal family as optimal.
Certainly families, and particularly women, struggling with the dual bur-
dens of maintaining a career and a family, understand the acute need to
change prevailing arrangements. Today most women do not want a life-
time of unpaid work in the home and economic dependence on a man.
Most women do not want this for themselves and certainly not for their
47. P. 80.
48. P. 78.
49. M. DE-.c'FR, THE NEW CHASTITY AND OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST WOMEN'S LIBERA-
TION 51 (1972).
50. P. 49.
51. Davis, The Political Economy of Late-Imperial America, NEW LEFT REV., Jan.-Feb. 1984,
at 6, 15-16. See also Jeffries & McGahey, Equity, Growth and Socioeconomic Change: Anti-
Discrimination Policy in an Era of Economic Transformation, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
233 (1985) (general discussion of effects of U.S. socioeconomic changes on antidiscrimination efforts).
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daughters. Indeed, most men do not want a lifetime burden of supporting
a dependent, patriarchal family.52
IV. GROWING OLD IN AMERICA: METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS
APPLIED
Consider-in very general terms-how the various ideologies Eisenstein
describes can be employed to illuminate one concrete problem. The Amer-
ican population is getting old. Since 1900, the proportion of the popula-
tion over 65 has grown from 4% to 11%; if present trends continue, 22%
of the population will be over 65 by 2050.
5 3 Assuming zero population
growth, the proportion of older people in the non-working population will
increase from approximately 25% in 1980 to about 40% by 2025.
5" While
care of the old is of course a timeless problem, our current demographic
patterns presage an era when large numbers of older people will be de-
pendent upon a younger generation that is relatively much smaller. In
political terms, it is probably even more relevant that the Baby Boomers,
the post World War II population cohort who have made waves as they
have passed through various stages of life, will soon reach the age when
disability and death of parents and contemporaries are increasingly
common.
At any one time, about one third of all people over age 65 require some
regular form of support services. 55 Older people experience great uncer-
tainty and anxiety about their ability to obtain services if and when
needed. The overwhelming majority of older people are women, with this
percentage increasing with age.58
The care of the old, like the care of the young, is performed by women.
Our patriarchal culture has created in women a deeply internalized sense
of personal responsibility to care for friends and families in times of need.
This "feminine" virtue is both a tremendous strength and a burden.
Women spend much time caring for elderly family members, friends and
neighbors: giving personal care, shopping and running errands, maintain-
52. See B. EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN: AMERICAN DREAMS AND THE FLIGHT FROM
COMMITMENT (1983).
53. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, CURRENT POP-
ULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-25, No. 922 (Oct. 1982), at 1.
54. Shanas & Hauser, Zero Population Growth and the Family Life of Old People, 30 J. Soc.
ISSUES 79, 82-83 (1974).
55. Brody, Women in the Middle and Family Help to Older People, 21 THE GERONTOLOGIST
471, 472 (1981). See Taub, From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 381 (1985).
56. See the data collected in Feldblum, Home Health Care for the Elderly: Programs, Problems,
and Potentials, 22 HARV. J. LEG. 193, 195 nn.12-14 (1985). Feldblum's article, and Taub, supra
note 55, detail excellent liberal feminist programs for providing nurturing care for old people. Both
are utopian in assuming a political will to increase greatly the social resources devoted to work tradi-
tionally done by women "volunteers."
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ing households and finances, coordinating and monitoring services from
other sources, and filling in when other care arrangements break down.57
In addition, women also constitute the vast majority of paid workers who
care for the old, either at home or in institutions." In terms of pay and
status, the work these women perform shares the bottom of the occupa-
tional hierarchy with the work of women who care for children.59
"Caregivers" is a euphemism for women.
Providing care for old people is costly. Individuals bearing this respon-
sibility do so at high personal cost, either financially or in terms of lost
opportunities to do other forms of work. 0 Although we devote substantial
public resources to care for the old,"1 services fall far short of need.62
Both the New Right and the neoconservatives oppose public funding for
programs supporting or supplementing family-based services, both be-
cause such programs undermine "voluntary" patriarchal structures and
because they cost money, inescapably requiring either higher taxes or re-
ductions in defense spending. They view the care of elderly people as the
responsibility of family, church, and community organizations. For exam-
ple, a 1980 House report on the needs of the aged decries the decrease in
women's participation in voluntary community service, arguing that "a
shift back to such a natural system as the voluntary sector is in order." 3
The report predicted that the "rate of increase in the proportion of
women working outside the home . . . would slacken."" This prediction
proved wrong. Women continue to need and seek paid work; the status
and support for voluntary work have not increased. For reasons suggested
above, neither the neoconservatives' wistful desire to reinvigorate the pa-
triarchal family, nor the New Right's more aggressive program to do so, is
likely to succeed.
As the economic gap between the rich and the poor grows, it is possible
57. Brody, supra note 55, at 474.
58. OFFI:E OF HUMAN DFv. ADMIN. ON AGING, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
PUB. No. 77-20086, HOMEMAKER-HOME HEALTH AIDE SERVICES 15 (1977).
59. N I. WI-r & P. MAHERNY, WOMEN'S WORK: UP FROM .878, REPORT ON THE DOT RE-
SEARCH PROJECT1- 11 (1975), discussed in Law, supra note 14, at 1307-08.
60. Taub, supra note 55, at 387.
61. In 1985 the three largest federal domestic spending programs were Social Security, Medicare,
Part A (the hospital insurance program for the aged and disabled) and Medicare, Part B (the physi-
cian insurance program for the aged and disabled). STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
98-rH CONG., 2D SI-S., MEDICARE: PAYING THE PHYSICIAN-HISTORY, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS
(Comm. Print 1984).
Medicaid-the state/federal program providing health insurance to the poor-is the largest item in
many state budgets, R. BOV1JERG & J. HOLAHAN, MEDICAID IN THE REAGAN ERA: FEDERAL POL-
I(:Y AND SrA'rE CHoic:s 3 (1982), and in fiscal year 1979, 42.3% of Medicaid expenditures were
devoted to nursing home care. Id. at 45.
62. Feldblum, supra note 56, at 197-210.
63. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN SERVICES, SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 96TH
CON;., 2D S: ss., FUTURE DIRECT-IONS FOR AGING POLICY: A HUMAN SERVICE MODEL 75 (1980).
64. Id. at 66.
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that those on the winning side of the widening gulf will have greater re-
tirement income or more comprehensive employment-related insurance
benefits for the custodial services they will need in old age. But private
insurance benefits for such care are rare today, and are too costly ever to
be widespread.65 For the vast majority of us, particularly women, it is
wholly unrealistic to expect that we will retire with sufficient income or
insurance to purchase essential supportive services. In short, the New
Right and neoconservative visions for the elderly are bleak for all but the
very rich.
Contrast with these a variety of feminist visions for caring for the eld-
erly in America. Feminists who embrace the value of differences between
men and women would celebrate women's culture and morality of nurture
and care.66 Frail elderly women, and those wage workers and family
members who care for them, are largely silent and invisible today. Giving
voice to these women's stories through poetry, prose, movies, movements,
news and networks is vitally important to enhance the individual and so-
cial appreciation of this traditional women's culture.
67 But, Eisenstein ar-
gues, glorification of a "private" world of love, care and nurture will not
empower the women who live both in those private worlds and the public
worlds of landlords, doctors, nursing homes, Medicaid and Medicare,
which are in turn shaped by even larger forces of tax policy, public fi-
nance, the national and international flow of capital and labor and
more.6
8
Other feminists who argue that women should be "free to choose" the
work and roles traditionally reserved for men or for women
6 9 fail to ap-
preciate the extent to which the world must be remade in order to make
the choice real. That is not to say that liberal legal rights have no role to
play in expanding choice.70 Rights can increase women's access to tradi-
65. See Somers, Long Term Care for the Elderly and Disabled: A New Health Priority, 307 N.
ENG. J. MED. 221 (1982); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RPT. No. PAD-80-12, ENTERING
A NURSING HOME: COSTLY IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAID AND THE ELDERLY (1979). The cost of
health insurance benefits for retirees has become a major source of concern for corporate America.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and now a director of the
Chrysler Corporation, estimates that the 500 largest industrial corporations currently owe present and
future retirees a total of $2 trillion, an amount exceeding the $1.4 trillion total assets of those compa-
nies. Freudenheim, Company Expenses for Retirees Soar, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
66. Jean Elshtain, for example, argues that "familial existence is a presuppositional feature of
social existence." J. ELSHTAIN, supra note 20, at 323.
67. For a rich portrait of this world see D. LESSING, THE DIARY OF JANE SOMMERS (1984).
68. For example, Jean Elshtain defends an understanding of family life that grounds "women in
the relations that allow them to stand in criticism of the state and public world." P. 219. Eisenstein
asks in response: How is a welfare mother "free to stand against the state" and where does the
"privacy" of her family life begin and end? Id.
69. See supra note 23.
70. P. 235. See, e.g., In re Rose Septuagenarian, 126 Misc. 2d 699, 483 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Fain. Ct.
1984) (party's name fictionalized for case publication). In this case, the court ordered support for a
72-year-old woman from the pension fund of her husband who was in a nursing home where his care
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tional male jobs that provide the compensation, insurance and retirement
benefits that support a measure of security in old age. Legal rights could
increase the value attached to nurturing work through Social Security for
homemakers, more adequate welfare programs, support payments at the
end of marriage that recognize the value of traditional women's work, and
expanded public support for nurturing leaves from wage work.7 1
But the content of legal rights that shape the options and choices availa-
ble to us is determined through political struggle. Even the most funda-
mental negative rights, such as the right to speak or to control our bodies
free from government constraint, acquire concrete meaning only as people
act collectively to claim them.72 And negative rights are more easily en-
forced than affirmative liberties .7  Rights that do not impose direct dollar
costs on a public budget are easier to protect than those that require pub-
lic expenditures.7 4 Also, however difficult it is to create and implement
public entitlements to material support, a right to a check is more easily
affectuated than a right to a caring and supportive human relationship.75
Older people, and those who care for them, need material support. But
social support for families traditionally has been available only after the
"voluntary" services of family and friends are exhausted .7  Powerful fiscal
was financed by Medicaid.
The case was litigated as a feminist claim to financial recognition of the contribution that the
woman had made to the family through her lifetime. The court found, "to deprive women, and partic-
ularly women of petitioner's generation who, in many cases, were denied an equal opportunity to
fulfill their potential in the employment market and are, therefore, dependent on their husbands for
support, access to their husbands' pension and assets in their later years effectively sentences many of
them to tremendous hardship and a complete disruption of their lives at a time when they are ex-
tremely vulnerable." 126 Misc. 2d at 702, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
A coalition of feminists and advocates for the elderly persuaded the City of New York to abandon
its effort to have the decision overturned, politically or in the courts. Conversation with Ellice Fatoul-
lah, attorney for Rose Septuagenarian, Jan. 22, 1986. See also Sullivan, Nursing Costs Force Elderly
to Sue Spouses, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
71. Taub, supra note 55; Feldblum, supra note 56.
72. See D. Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D.
Kairys ed. 1982).
73. For a classic statement of this proposition, see 1. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY
(1958).
74. For example, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court upheld a law deny-
ing additional welfare payments to families of more than five people despite the obvious adverse
impact on family autonomy and compositional choice, which in other contexts the Court has recog-
nized as an aspect of constitutionally protected liberty. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977).
75. "Too frequently there is attributed to law and its agents a magical power-a power to do
what is far beyond its means. . . . The law, so far as specific individual relationships are concerned,
is a relatively crude instrument. It may be able to destroy human relationships; but it does not have
the power to compel them to develop. It neither has the sensitivity nor the resources to maintain or
supervise the ongoing day-to-day happenings between parent and child." J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD &
A. SOI.Nrr, BEYOND THE BIST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 49-50 (1973).
76. See generally tenBroeck, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development,
and Present Status (pt. III), 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965); Tully, Family Responsibility Laws: An
Unwise and Unconstitutional Imposition, 5 FAM. L.Q. 32 (1971).
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and human considerations support this traditional preference and argue
for public services that bolster, rather than supplant, voluntary family
based care.
All these factors demand collective action, both to generate the political
support for the programs that would give content to "choice" for older
people and to explore the borders between voluntary family-based services
and their exhaustion. Feminist consciousness raising can serve both these
functions.
Eisenstein characterizes consciousness raising as the methodology of
feminism77 and recognizes that through it women develop a sense of col-
lective power "in actual struggle against patriarchal privilege."
'7 8 Feminist
consciousness raising is a process of self-reflection and action that values
women's personal experience and understands that experience as politi-
cal. 79 It is "break[ing] out of. . . accustomed ways of responding to domi-
nation by acting as if [we] could change things."
0
Powerful forces deter active feminist consciousness raising. Women who
bear the dual burden of family care and undervalued wage labor have too
few hours in a day for sleep, much less for attending these sessions. Fur-
thermore, patriarchal culture discourages feminist consciousness raising:
In male dominated institutions, women are rewarded for being one of the
boys and punished for seeking common cause and understanding with
other women."' Yet widespread consciousness raising could ultimately
lead to collective action aimed at changing these circumstances.
In the early 1970's consciousness raising played a critical role in the
rise of feminism. Thousands of women-mostly young, white and middle
class-achieved new understandings of their lives and our world. Work
experiences in which they had been denied responsibility were now un-
derstood not as personal failures or bad luck but as examples of the perva-
sive assumption that men necessarily are better at certain jobs. Daily life
77. P. 151.
78. P. 154.
79. Although men too could benefit from collective efforts to understand and break out 
of the
constraints that our gendered culture imposes upon them, the process for them is inescapably 
differ-
ent. "A white man can afford to be unreflective because he finds himself in a world created 
in his
image. For a woman to be unreflective in a man's world is to be objectified, silenced, 
and passi-
fied-to he rendered an object. The feminist critic, forced to look to nontraditional sources and meth-
ods for validation, finds a ground in her own suppressed experience intersubjectively affirmed 
and
confirmed. Thus, it is in women's interests to be self-reflective where it is not necessarily 
in men's
interests." Cole, Getting There: Reflections on Trashing From Feminist Jurisprudence and 
Critical
Theory, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 81 (1985).
80. Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: 
A
Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 557-58 
(1984)
(emphasis deleted).
81. R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 206-42 (1977); Taub, 
Keeping
Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 
B.C.L.
REv. 345, 358 (1980).
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provided material for urgent inquiry. Can women in traditionally male
jobs express honest emotion without undermining our already fragile
credibility? Can we build both commitment and adventure in loving rela-
tions? How can men be persuaded to share responsibility for childcare?
For many women the consciousness raising experience inspired actions
that changed the course of their lives.
Such groups were not the only, or perhaps even the most significant,
forms of feminist consciousness raising. The thousands of women who, in
the early 1970's, bore witness to the experience of illegal abortions en-
gaged in a form of consciousness raising that radically transformed the
law."2 Women who join together to create a community of psychic and
material support against rape and domestic violence are engaged in con-
sciousness raising.8" In many businesses, unions and schools, women help
each other to comprehend their situation in feminist terms and act pursu-
ant to that understanding.
Both older women and the women who care for them, in families and
the wage market, require consciousness raising to generate courage and
energy to demand needed social support services. The patriarchal vision
that the family (i.e., women) cares for the old hinders the development of
social responses to the needs of the elderly and disabled, just as it hinders
the development of social supports for the care of children. Younger
women need consciousness raising to sort out the difference between af-
firmative desire to help and burdens imposed by a gendered culture and
enforced by resentment and guilt. If younger women, raised in an era of
sexual liberation, need consciousness raising to figure out what we really
want to do with that liberty, then surely a similar process is essential to
empower older women to understand their needs for affection, human
warmth, and sexuality and to explore how those needs can be met.
Exploring the social meaning of gender, analytically and experientially,
is hard work. As social beings, our identities, needs, responsibilities, feel-
ings, pains and pleasures do not spring fully formed from some internal,
individual core; rather, they are shaped by social relationships. As femi-
nists we need to struggle openly with these issues. We need to talk with
82. See D. SCHULDER & F. KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP (1971).
83. See V. RANDALL, WOMEN AND PoLmIcs (1982); N. MCGLEN & K. O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES
(1983).
There are many other forms of consciousness raising that are not explicitly feminist. For example,
welfare recipients exploring together the personal and political causes of their problems and acting
together on the conviction that their children deserve shoes and coats are engaged in a form of con-
sciousness raising. See G. WEST, THE NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1982). The civil
rights and black power movements concerned not only legal change, but also liberation and conscious-
ness raising-understanding the connections between the personal and political, experiencing less ra-
cist ways of being white or black.
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others who share both a basic commitment to the worth of women and the
experiences that are common to women. We need consciousness raising
because we live in a culture in which great meaning is attached to gender.
Such sharing produces insight and builds community, which in turn gen-
erates energy and courage for transformative change.
Zillah Eisenstein provides us with a strong statement of the theory of
feminism. Analysis is important, but more is needed to move us from the-
ory to action to power. Through mechanisms such as consciousness rais-
ing, Eisenstein's theoretical framework can provide the foundation for
great social progress toward sexual equality.
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